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Introduction
This study investigates the communicational role that iconic hand
gestures (see McNeill 1985) play in everyday talk. When we talk about
iconic gestures, we are referring to very special sorts of hand
movements, which most people produce unconsciously, and which
seem to convey meaning associated with the content of spontaneous
speech. Iconic gestures must be distinguished from all other types of
hand movements, like beats (or batonics, see Efron 1941, Ekman and
Friesen 1969), which are quick, simple movements of the hand, which
tend to follow the prosodic patterns of speech. Beats serve the purpose
of stressing those parts of speech that a speaker considers to be
important; thus beats diﬀer from iconic gestures by being related to
the pragmatic rather than the semantic content of speech. Deictics, on
the other hand, are pointing gestures referring to either actually present
or imagined objects or locations. In deictics, the shape of the hand
does not, unlike with iconic gestures, convey semantic information itself,
but together with the accompanying speech it becomes clear how a
speaker is referring to his or her imagined or real surrounding. A fourth
class of gestures, emblems, are gestures readily understandable in the
absence of speech, as they are gestural signs with a strict, but culturally
deﬁned, verbal translation. For instance, the very common sign for
‘excellence’ in many Western European countries is represented by the
index ﬁnger and the thumb forming a circular shape while the hand is
swung away from the mouth accompanied by a kiss. Last of all, there are
sign languages, which are diﬀerent from iconic gestures, as they represent
a whole gestural code, in which gestures substitute for speech and in
which they are governed by conventional rules concerning meaning
and grammar. In this paper, we are concerned solely with iconic
gestures and their possible communicational signiﬁcance in everyday
conversation.
Semiotica 142–1/4 (2002), 31–69 0037–1998/02/0142–0031
# Walter de Gruyter
The theory of iconic gestures communicating semantic information
In 1985 McNeill proposed an important theory concerning the
communicational function of iconic gestures and how these combine
with the verbal mode of communication. He described speech and iconic
gestures as being two forms of communication, which diﬀer in the way
that they communicate information as well as in the kinds of information
they convey. The linguistic system is constrained by standardized rules of
grammar as well as by the morphemes out of which it is constructed. This
requires speech to be of a segmented-linear kind, as it consists of linear
chains of individual words governed by syntactic structures thereby
acquiring meaning. Iconic gestures, on the other hand, are global-
synthetic ‘in that the whole is not composed out of separately meaningful
parts. Rather, the parts gain meaning because of the meaning of the
whole’ (McNeill 1992: 20). Moreover, they are noncombinatoric, as a
certain meaning is not depicted in two separate gestures performed one
after another, but rather the meaning is integrated into one single gesture.
Thus, an event might be represented by one simple gesture, whereas
several units of speech are necessary to describe the equivalent event.
To illustrate the diﬀerence between global-synthetic gestures and
linear-segmented speech, McNeill (1992: 20) provided the following
example (see appendix for transcription conventions):
‘[and he’s trying to run ahead of it]’
[hand moves forward at chin level while ﬁngers wiggle]
The verbal information here consists of ten diﬀerent morphemes,
conveyed sequentially, whereas the gestural information consists of the
hand performing two diﬀerent movements simultaneously. As the
meanings of the individual words have to be interpreted in the context
of the whole sentence, the information of the part can change when the
utterance is ﬁnally complete, whereas the gestural meaning is conveyed
immediately by the wiggling movement, which can be interpreted as a
running movement at the same time that the moving hand is seen as
representing the running character, with the ﬁngers here representing the
moving legs. The main feature of the gesture is that both facets of
communication are performed at the same time.
Comparing the kinds of information transmitted by iconic gestures and
speech, McNeill suggested that iconic gestures can contribute informa-
tion, which is congruent with the information contained in speech in some
particular cases, whereas in other cases the information in the gesture can
be seen as additional to the information conveyed by the speech. The
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following two examples (extracted from McNeill 1992: 106) may help to
clarify this diﬀerence:
‘he tries going [up the inside] of the drainpipe’
[hand rises up with the index ﬁnger extended, depicting the
character rising up and possibly the interiority of the pipe]
Here, the iconic gesture depicts mainly ‘upward movement’, which may
seem redundant, as the gesture looks as if it only conveys information also
present in speech. In discussing this example, McNeill said that, ‘the
gestural and the linguistic channels exhibit(ed) the same meaning’
(McNeill 1985: 352). The next example shows a slightly diﬀerent case
(extracted from McNeill 1992: 14):
‘and she [chases him out again]’
[hand appears to swing an object through the air]
This example shows the case of an iconic gesture contributing additional
information, which is clearly not included in the accompanying utterance.
The verbal information describes the mode of action and the recurrent
nature of the action, but not the means, i.e., the reason one character
is running away from the other is because it is being chased by a
character wielding an umbrella. The linguistic description alone allows
for considerable opportunity for a listener’s personal associations and
interpretation to be added, as it leaves a number of details of the action
undeﬁned. Iconic gestures in general display the imagistic side of scenes or
objects, and thus the iconic gesture adds here some of the specifying
details that the speech itself does not provide. Since the gesture provides
not only information about the fact that an instrument is involved
(umbrella), but also about how it is being used (swung from left to right),
the iconic gesture illustrates in some detail how the action is actually being
accomplished.
Thus, comparing the semantic information transmitted by the gestures
in the ﬁrst two examples above, it can be seen that the contribution of
iconic gestures to communication over and above the actual speech itself
can vary considerably. McNeill concluded from this and related
observations that iconic gestures and the verbal utterance that they
accompany may be partially overlapping in terms of the semantic
information they convey, but that when the gestures exhibit information
not available in speech, then they are not merely co-expressive but rather
they are complementary. Hence, McNeill argued that iconic gestures can
provide additional insight into speakers’ thoughts and their speciﬁc
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cognitive representations of the original scene, and that sometimes an
interlocutor is able to get the full information about a speaker’s mental
representation only by receiving information from both the iconic gesture
and the speech simultaneously.
McNeill (1985) argued that the gestural and the linguistic system
must be closely intertwined in that the cognitive processes underlying
the generation of iconic gestures and speech must be suﬃciently close that
they share a computational stage. He drew attention to the fact that
speech and iconic gestures seem to show parallel patterns of develop-
mental processes in young children, since the iconic gestures generated
by children who, in terms of Piaget’s theoretical framework, have
not yet reached certain ‘cognitive stages’ seem to mismatch with the
accompanying verbal utterances. Furthermore, McNeill maintained
that neurological damage seems to have parallel eﬀects on the generation
of gestures and speech. For example, aphasics of the Wernicke type,
who have diﬃculties in combining single utterances into a semantically
coherent whole, seem to have diﬃculty in generating iconic gestures,
whereas aphasics suﬀering from the Broca type show a marked
disturbance in producing speech with a correct grammatical structure
and they seem to display a disturbance in the generation of beats. Beats,
as discussed earlier, are hand movements with no semantic content
but a close linkage to grammatical structure, and that serve a variety
of pragmatic functions (for a more detailed discussion, see McNeill
1985: 353–366). McNeill also maintained that the close relationship
between gestures and speech is characterized by a number of other general
characteristics. He argued that gestures occur exclusively together with
speech, and that cases in which they do not are very rare. Furthermore,
McNeill stated that iconic gestures and speech are temporally and
semantically synchronous in the sense that iconic gestures occur
simultaneously with those parts of speech that refer to the same semantic
idea as the gesture itself does, and that ‘iconic _ gestures almost never
cross clause boundaries’ (McNeill 1985: 360-361).
In summary, McNeill has developed the theoretical idea that iconic
gesture and speech form a unitary, integrated system such that an
interlocutor must receive information from both sources in order to
obtain the full picture that any given speaker has in mind. However,
he has also argued that iconic gestures and speech diﬀer in the way
that they represent semantic information as well as in the kinds of
information that they provide. McNeill’s theory provides a unique and
highly valuable framework for the analysis of the communicational role
of iconic gestures, but his theory fails to answer the question to what
extent the information represented by both modes of communication
34 J. Holler and G. Beattie
is generally redundant with respect to each other or not. McNeill’s
analyses also have not systematically considered how the representation
of semantic information is split between the gestural and the linguistic
channels.
There is perhaps one important point to make at this juncture. As the
basis for his analyses, and throughout all of his subsequent theoretical
arguments, McNeill uses clausal units as the fundamental speech units,
clauses that are extracted from more complex segments of speech, but
which are those parts of these complex segments of speech that are
themselves accompanied by an iconic gesture. However, one might say
that there is something a little curious about this. McNeill does, after
all, stress that speech is linearly segmented in nature with a number of
sequential dependencies, and that speech, unlike iconic gesture, takes
time to unfold in talk in order to get its meaning across. Thus, an
exclusive focus on the immediate syntactic clause might seem a little
premature here, because critical semantic information is likely to be
communicated in neighboring clauses. We will return to this important
point subsequently.
Experimental investigations testing the communicational role of
iconic gestures
Beattie and Shovelton conducted several studies in which they
investigated empirically the communicational eﬀect of iconic gestures
by testing the amount of information respondents gleaned from iconic
gestures (Beattie and Shovelton 1999a, 1999b, 2002). In all of these
studies, they used questionnaires or interviews with decoders as the
primary method of measuring the amount of information respondents
received from iconic gestures. This represented a rather innovative
approach to research on gestures, as previous researchers had focussed
their analyses on how speech and gestures are generated, but had not
tested the possible communicative eﬀects on decoders. The decoders in the
Beattie and Shovelton studies were interviewed after either having seen
videoclips of single iconic gestures, which were extracted from cartoon
narratives from other participants, accompanied by the corresponding
clausal units of speech (video condition) or after only having heard the
speech of the corresponding clausal units without seeing the gesture
(audio-only condition). In two studies (1999b, 2002), Beattie and
Shovelton introduced a third condition, in which the decoders saw the
gestures from the video-clips played without the sound (vision-only
condition). The decoder interviews either consisted of predetermined
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questions referring to individual semantic categories, such as ‘objects
identiﬁed’, ‘action of objects’, ‘shape’, ‘size’, ‘movement’, ‘direction of
movement/speed’, and ‘relative position’ (1999a, 1999b, study 1 of Beattie
and Shovelton 2002), or they involved the more open-ended method of
simply asking the decoders to write down any information they had
received from the gesture or the speech or from both simultaneously
(study 2 of Beattie and Shovelton 2002). Also, in one study, the
respondents had to answer the questions in a yes/no format (1999a);
in others they had to write down the answers in a free format (1999b,
2002).
All of the above studies showed consistently that there was an increased
overall accuracy in the answers when the decoders saw the iconic gestures
in addition to hearing the speech (video) compared to only hearing the
speech (audio-only). Moreover, the iconic gestures displayed on their own
(vision-only) seemed to have communicated a considerable amount of
information. However, with regard to the diﬀerent semantic categories,
the amount of information transmitted by iconic gestures on their own
was statistically signiﬁcant only with regard to the category ‘relative
position’ in all the studies (1999a, 1999b, 2002), as well as ‘relative size’
in some but not all the studies (1999a, 1999b, study 1 of Beattie and
Shovelton 2002).
In addition to investigating the communication of semantic informa-
tion by iconic gestures, Beattie and Shovelton (2002) also considered
another important aspect of McNeill’s theory (1992), namely the concept
of the viewpoint of the gesture. McNeill (1992) had diﬀerentiated between
iconic gestures, which express a ‘character viewpoint’ (C-VPT) from
those which express an ‘observer viewpoint’ (O-VPT). A C-VPT gesture
‘incorporates the speaker’s body into the gesture space, and the speaker’s
hands represent the hands (paws, etc.) of the character’ (McNeill
1992: 119), whereas an O-VPT gesture ‘excludes the speaker’s body from
the gesture space, and his hands play the part of the character as a whole’
(McNeill 1992: 119). With reference to the examples above, this means
that the iconic gesture accompanying the verbal utterance ‘and he’s trying
to run ahead of it’ would be classiﬁed as an O-VPT gesture, since
here the narrator’s hand represents the running character and his ﬁngers
the character’s legs. The iconic gesture accompanying the clause ‘and
she chases him out again’, on the other hand, would be classiﬁed as a
C-VPT gesture, because the narrator imitates the character swinging the
umbrella. McNeill had attempted to connect these diﬀerent types of
iconic gestures to the narrative distance that they express; he had argued
that the diﬀerent viewpoints in gestures serve as a narrative strategy in the
sense that a speaker can alter the narrative distance by being more or less
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‘remote from the ﬁctive world’ (McNeill 1992: 191) with C-VPT gestures
diminishing the narrative distance and O-VPT gestures increasing it.
Beattie and Shovelton (2002), however, suggested that the diﬀerent
gestural viewpoints might pragmatically be even more important than this
in that they might not only function as regulators of narrative distance,
but they might also diﬀer in the amount and perhaps even the type of
semantic information they communicate. They investigated this by
categorizing iconic gestures in their decoder studies according toMcNeill’s
deﬁnition of gestural viewpoints and found that, although O-VPT
gestures did communicate semantic information to some extent, C-VPT
gestures were signiﬁcantly better than O-VPT gestures at conveying
semantic information overall, and in particular at conveying positional
information (36.4 mean percentage accuracy for C-VPT gestures for
positional information versus 5.3 mean percentage accuracy for O-VPT
gestures). Beattie and Shovelton therefore concluded that gesture view-
point directly mediates the communicative power of the iconic gesture,
and that C-VPT gestures seem to be of higher communicative power than
O-VPT gestures.
In summary, the results of Beattie and Shovelton’s experimental
studies suggested, in line with McNeill’s theory, that iconic gestures do
communicate a considerable amount of semantic information in talk.
Moreover, Beattie and Shovelton argued that the results demonstrate
more than this, namely that iconic gestures reveal critical information
that is poorly transmitted in the speech, particularly about properties of
the objects depicted. For example, they found that gestures revealed
information about the size of an object, when the hand has been used
pantomimically to show how a small object is being held. They also
found that decoders picked up information about relative position, for
example about the position of the nose relative to the hand when a
gesture demonstrated how the nose is being squeezed, and that char-
acter viewpoint gestures communicated this type of semantic infor-
mation especially well. Although these semantic aspects, relative size
and relative position, were the only ones that decoders received a
statistically signiﬁcant amount of information about, Beattie and
Shovelton also found that information about other semantic aspects
was conveyed to a certain extent by the iconic gestures displayed on
their own. This information concerned the number of objects involved,
the identity of objects, as well as about the speed and movement of the
action. Thus, they concluded, ‘that McNeill (1985) had seriously
underestimated the amount and the nature of information conveyed by
these complex and often elaborate iconic gestures that accompany
speech’ (1999b: 455).
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This experimental approach of Beattie and Shovelton was based very
closely on McNeill’s theoretical framework, and their studies tended to
focus on the clausal unit, which the gesture was seen to accompany. In
fact, only in their ﬁrst study (1999a) did they include some extracts of
speech that were longer than individual clauses (see, for example, Beattie
and Shovelton 1999a: 15). Beattie and Shovelton viewed this, perhaps
rightly, as a methodological shortcoming in studies of this kind, and they
argued that ‘varying sizes of extracts could possibly explain why some
semantic categories were signiﬁcant rather than others’ (Beattie and
Shovelton 1999b: 444). As a consequence, they used exclusively clausal
units in all of their subsequent studies (1999b, 2002). Thus, although there
seems to be strong evidence that iconic gestures do communicate semantic
information in the absence of speech, the question remains to what extent
the ﬁndings would have been diﬀerent from this, if the studies had used
larger linguistic units speciﬁcally designed to carry the full range of
semantic information in a scene or event description.
The present study
In order to introduce the core considerations of the present study, a
number of important theoretical and methodological issues need to be
addressed. The ﬁrst issue is the social context from which we extract
our linguistic and our gestural material. McNeill (1985), and sub-
sequently Beattie and Shovelton in their experimental studies, have
used participants narrating cartoon stories. However, the social context
employed here has always been of a particular kind, notably a narrator
telling a story in the presence of a confederate, who quite explicitly does
not engage in conversational interaction with the narrator. A study by
Beattie and Aboudan (1994) showed that the frequencies of iconic
gestures changed quite dramatically in diﬀerent social contexts. Among
others, they compared the frequencies of iconic gestures generated in a
monologue condition to those generated in a dialogue condition, and
found that there was a signiﬁcant increase in gesture production in
association with the dialogue condition, i.e., where the confederate
interacted with the narrator of the story. Thus, one could present the
argument that any analysis of gestures, which is not partly based on
conversational material, is simply too restrictive, given that conversa-
tion is the natural forum for everyday talk, and in addition given that
this is the social context in which iconic gestures are the most common.
Thus, in the present study we use conversational material as our primary
focus.
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Second, although the ﬁndings by Beattie and Shovelton (1999a, 1999b,
2002) can be seen as probably the most striking evidence supporting
McNeill’s communication theory (1985), it has to be noted that, as
Beattie and Shovelton themselves stated, there is ‘as yet, no theoretical
explanation as to why only these particular semantic features [relative
position and relative size] should be signiﬁcant’ (Beattie and Shovelton
1999a: 28). In the present study, we aim to tackle this question directly.
One hypothesis might simply be that the gestural and the linguistic
systems are indeed closely interlinked and that the representation of
semantic information is partitioned between both of these communica-
tional channels, such that the semantic features ‘relative position’ and
‘relative size’ are represented gesturally very well but not at all well
linguistically. We consider this hypothesis in the present study by
analyzing in detail how the two semantic features that emerged in these
studies as the most signiﬁcant in terms of gestural communication are
partitioned between the linguistic and the gestural channels. In pursuit
of this question, we apply a more micro-analytic approach to our data
than previously used, a micro-analytic approach that involves analyzing
semantic information in a very detailed manner by using categories that
are sensitive to capture important semantic diﬀerences. The categories
‘relative position’ and ‘relative size’, as applied by Beattie and Shovelton,
seem rather broad in the sense that they may mask important diﬀerences
between certain semantic aspects. For example, Beattie and Shovelton
(1999a, 1999b, 2002) asked respondents if they received any information
about ‘the position of object(s) relative to anything else’. It could be
argued, however, that the category ‘relative position’ as such incorporates
a range of quite diﬀerent semantic aspects that may all relate to some kind
of positional information, but in crucially diﬀerent ways. For example, if
we ask someone to reconstruct a scene that he or she will be told about,
which includes spatial features, this person may need information about,
for example, the position of entity ‘a’ relative to entity ‘b’, the position of
entity ‘b’ relative to entity ‘c’, as well as about the position of entity ‘a’
relative to entity ‘c’ to be able to do so. Since a question asking simply for
information about ‘relative position’ is not likely to be answered by
decoders in such an explicit way that they will state in any real detail
which potential aspects of this category they received information about,
we decided that such aspects should be considered as diﬀerent semantic
sub-categories. Therefore, we aim to distinguish these diﬀerent semantic
aspects of the same basic category, in the ﬁrst instance, by splitting the
category ‘relative position’ into four sub-categories, as well as by
distinguishing size information according to which kinds of entities it
referred to (see Table 1).
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Third, we use a fundamentally diﬀerent approach to that employed
by Beattie and Shovelton. In this study, we analyze the data from a
traditional linguistic perspective in the sense that we focus on the semantic
information that is encoded in the gestural and the linguistic channels of
communication. Of course, it could be argued that if one is interested in
the communicational role of iconic gestures, then decoder studies, like
those of Beattie and Shovelton, are the most appropriate method for
determining what kind of semantic information is communicated by
iconic gestures, but on the other hand, decoder studies represent a method
that clearly has a number of inherent limitations and disadvantages. For
example, one has to use relatively broad semantic categories, since
otherwise the tasks would be too time consuming and thus might exceed
the decoders’ attention capacity or it might lead to a decrease of moti-
vation on the part of the participants. Thus, for example, when Beattie
and Shovelton questioned their decoders about relative position (‘What is
the position of the object(s) relative to anything else?’), they intended to
tap with this single question information about the position of objects
relative to each other, about the location of an action, about the
orientation of objects, and about contact (see Beattie and Shovelton
1999b: 447). The consequence might here be that it is relatively diﬃcult to
diﬀerentiate which of these semantic aspects the decoders actually
received information about, since decoders only gave one general answer
to this question. Nevertheless, Beattie and Shovelton’s studies revealed
highly interesting ﬁndings concerning the communicational function of
iconic gestures, since they hint at those semantic aspects that seem to be
signiﬁcantly well communicated by iconic gestures. Thus, Beattie and
Shovelton’s ﬁndings represent the basis for our analysis. More precisely,
we chose to tie these earlier ﬁndings in with an investigation that uses a
somewhat diﬀerent methodological approach, and which will thus
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provide a diﬀerent analytic view of the same issue. In other words, we
hope to throw light on the communicational role that iconic gestures play
in talk from a somewhat diﬀerent angle to see if the existing view of this
complex issue is perhaps too narrow.
Fourth, this study attempts to recognize explicitly the fact that the
linguistic representation of semantic information happens sequentially
over successive clauses, whereas imagistic gestural representations are
more or less instantaneous, co-occurring with only a small part of speech,
namely the clausal unit. The fact that McNeill’s and almost all of Beattie
and Shovelton’s analyses (an exception being their 1999a study, see
above) were based on clausal units rather than more complex linguistic
segments might therefore have had considerable implications for their
conclusions concerning the amount and kinds of semantic information
that iconic gestures and speech represent. This is because they may have
ignored important semantic information that might have been repre-
sented elsewhere in the verbal utterance rather than in the immediate
clausal unit. As we have already discussed, Beattie and Shovelton (1999b)
did explicitly wonder whether the size of the extracts of speech might
potentially have had an impact on the communicative eﬀectiveness of
gestures, but size of extract was not systematically manipulated in any of
their studies. In the present study, we use semantic and speciﬁcally
ideational rather than clausal units as the basis for our analysis, and it
will be interesting to determine if this particular theoretical decision will
have an eﬀect on the pattern of our results.
Our last point is that Beattie and Shovelton found that a crucial
mediator for the communicative power of iconic gestures was the view-
point of the gesture. However, the only explanation, which they oﬀer to
explain their observation that C-VPT gestures were signiﬁcantly better
at conveying positional information than O-VPT gestures is that the
majorityof theirC-VPTgestureswere direct reenactments of the action that
the narrators discussed. We attempt here to gain more insight into how
the communication of semantic information is inﬂuenced by diﬀerences in
gestural viewpoint by oﬀering a micro-analytic analysis of how C-VPT
gestures andO-VPT gestures represent both position and size information.
Method
Participants
Thirty-eight students of the University of Manchester took part in the
experiment.
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Stimuli
The stimulus material consisted of two ‘Tom and Jerry’ cartoon
stories (issue 30, 2000). Both cartoon stories contained minimal linguistic
information (three speech bubbles covering two short sentences, some
single verbs and various onomatopoeic expressions [e.g. ‘grrr’ or
‘ooomph’]). The stimulus material, both cartoons 1 and 2, represented
just the last two pages of longer stories (‘Park life’, pp. 22–29; ‘Unwanted
visitors’, pp. 31-35). Even though the cartoon extracts did not comprise
the entire story, these still allowed participants to develop a sense of
the overall narrative, and no participant appeared to display any diﬃculty
in telling the stories, even though they started in eﬀect at the midpoint
of the story. ‘Tom and Jerry’ cartoons typically consist of a chain of
events involving two (or sometimes three) characters interacting, and in
narrating that part of the story provided to them, the narrator is likely
to focus on single events and a number of directly successive actions.
Procedure
The 38 participants took part in the study in individual trials.
Each participant was led into an observation room by one of the
experimenters (JH) and was asked to sit down in an armchair. The
experimenter sat down on a chair in front of the participant slightly to his
or her right so that the experimenter could reach an overhead projector
placed to the right of the participant’s seat. The cartoon stories were
projected onto the wall in front of the participant. Due to the arrangement
of seats, the experimenter did not face the wall that the cartoon stories
were projected on; this was intended to create a situation as similar as
possible to a face-to-face conversation. The participants were video-
recorded with an unobtrusive video camera and informed about the
presence of the camera before the experiment began in line with the ethical
guidelines of the British Psychological Society (BPS), who state that video
recordings of participants in research can only be made ‘with the
expressed agreement of those being recorded both to the recording being
made and to the subsequent conditions of access to it’ (2000: para. 4.5).
They were not told that the speciﬁc focus of the research was iconic
gestures, but that it was to do with communication generally. Then, the
experimenter asked the participants to narrate the cartoon stories in as
much detail as possible, imagining the experimenter to be a conversational
partner, who had never seen the pictures beforehand and did not know
anything about the stories. During the narration, the experimenter
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interacted with the respondent by asking questions about the story,
referring to the kinds of actions depicted and the ways in which they were
being carried out, and there were also questions asked about the cartoon
characters’ feelings and motives. This was designed to produce a situation
more like everyday conversational talk. Experimental evidence suggests
that iconic gestures are much more common in more conversational
situations (see Beattie and Aboudan 1994) than in those situations
employed more frequently in this type of research, which normally feature
a confederate who does not interact with the participants (see, for
example, Beattie and Shovelton 1999a and 1999b). After narrating the
cartoon stories, the participants were thanked and fully debriefed and
were oﬀered the opportunity to not have their recorded material analysed.
Analysis
Six ‘semantic events’, which diﬀerent narrators frequently referred to
linguistically, and which were also accompanied by iconic gestures, were
chosen to form the basis of the present analysis.
Event 1: Jerry the mouse is holding a spike, with which he is about to
stab Tom the cat, who is standing in front of him while the
mouse faces his back.
Event 2: This event refers to the past action of this stabbing with the
focus on the recipient, i.e., Tom having been stabbed by Jerry
(passive syntax/past tense).
Event 3: Tom is being pinned to the ground by a spike with which he has
been stabbed, and which is now stuck in his tail.
Event 4: A park keeper has lifted Tom up to carry him away, grabbing
him with his hand by the scruﬀ of the neck.
Event 5: A dog is holding Tom in front of him in the air by grabbing him
around the throat, strangling him.
Event 6: The dog has lifted Jerry up by the tail and is dangling the mouse
with the extended arm in front of his body.
Of these six semantic events, four events were extracted from narrations of
story 1 and two from narrations of story 2. Events 1–3 were represented in
consecutive pictures from story 1 and referred to an unfolding time series
of events involving Tom, Jerry, and the spike. Event 4 was also extracted
from cartoon 1, but was not immediately adjacent to the events already
described. Events 5 and 6 were represented in nonconsecutive pictures
from cartoon 2.
Micro-analytic investigation of iconic gestures and speech 43
The gestural data analyzed in the present study consisted of 58 iconic
gestures generated by 27 diﬀerent participants. The gestures all referred to
the same six semantic events from both cartoons. Considering the number
of gestures analyzed compared to the number of participants who
generated these gestures, it is obvious that sometimes iconic gestures that
stemmed from the same participant were included in the analysis;
however, the iconic gestures that referred to the individual semantic
events were all generated by diﬀerent participants. Also, if a narrator
referred to the same semantic event more than once and the speech was
accompanied by an iconic gesture, only the ﬁrst occurrence of the gesture
was analyzed.
The segments of speech analyzed were only those showing close
temporal relationship to the corresponding iconic gesture, i.e., the
semantic unit (operationalized as a sentence or as a small group of highly
related sentences related to the same semantic idea; see Butterworth 1975)
containing the lexical aﬃliate. The term ‘lexical aﬃliate’ refers to the
lexical component that relates to the iconic gesture ‘either semantically
(i.e., the shape that the gesture describes depicts a/the ‘‘meaning’’ or
referent of a word) or by word class (e.g., ‘‘locatives’’)’ (Schegloﬀ 1984:
275). The reason for the focus on sentential and semantic units rather than
clausal units (cf. McNeill 1992, Beattie and Shovelton 1999b, 2002) is
because we are concerned here with the relative contribution of speech
and gesture to the communication of semantic meaning, and because
ideational units (Butterworth 1975) are primarily semantic rather than
syntactic units of information. Those studies that have focused exclusively
on clausal units may have systematically underestimated the role of verbal
information generally in semantic communication. However, it must
be noted that verbal information not directly contained in the sentence
accompanied by the iconic gesture is only considered when the
information occurred in the sentence directly preceding or following
the one containing the lexical aﬃliate. In addition, the sentence must not
be accompanied by a new iconic gesture, and furthermore the successive
sentences must be describing the same underlying semantic idea. The
example below meets these criteria:
‘his tail’s been pinned to the ground by this spike, so he’s obviously
not been stabbed in the bottom, it was in the tail, by the spike,
wasn’t in the bottom. He’s been stabbed in the tail, which is [now
sort of ﬁxed into the ground]’.
[the hand is held at the height of the lap in the middle of the
narrator’s gesture space, the ﬁngers are curled in, only the index
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ﬁnger is extended and the hand moves up and down several
times on a small scale with the tip of the index ﬁnger ahead, so
that it looks as if the index ﬁnger would poke into something]
Here the two sentences clearly refer to the same underlying semantic idea,
and the parts of the utterance printed in italic directly describe the
respective semantic event and these consist of very similar information.
The parts of speech not printed in italic represent a self-correction of a
previously uttered sentence referring to a diﬀerent picture, and therefore
this information cannot be seen as relevant for the scoring (as it logically
would not make sense to score verbal information, which the speaker
himself in this moment judges as invalid information). Thus, the ﬁrst part
and the second part of the utterance describing the event are almost equal
concerning their morphology, apart from the fact that the ﬁrst part
includes additional information about the instrument (spike) and a verb
expressing slightly diﬀerent information (‘to pin down’ includes
information about the direction of a movement, whereas ‘to be ﬁxed to
something’ is a stative verb). As it is likely that, if the ﬁrst part of the
verbal information would not have been uttered, the speaker might have
speciﬁed the instrument in the second part of the utterance instead, and
might also have chosen a diﬀerent verb, it seems plausible to consider
these two aspects of information when scoring the verbal information.
The following example represents a somewhat diﬀerent case:
‘Jerry’s being held by his tail by the dog . . . ehm . . . I can’t tell
where he’s holding him . . . ehm . . . he’s holding him over
something, but I can’t tell what it is. And the dog is laughing
looking at Tom [while he’s dangling Jerry]. And Jerry’s
looking very scared now’.
[right hand is held in front of the narrator, ﬁngertips are
pointing to the ground, the tip of the index ﬁnger is touching the
thumb imitating a pincer-like grip]
Here, compared to the part of speech printed in italic (the part that has
been considered for analysis), the ﬁrst sentence contains additional
information about the part of the body from which the mouse is being
dangled (tail). Yet, this information has not been taken into account, as
the two sentences are clearly separated by two other important aspects,
which the speaker clearly focuses on, namely the exact position of Jerry in
the surrounding space and the relationship between the dog and Tom.
After that, the speaker picks up again the former description of the
Micro-analytic investigation of iconic gestures and speech 45
respective action (the dog dangling — or holding — Jerry). Thus, in com-
parison to the preceding example, it seems that here both parts of speech
referring to the same ‘semantic event’ are separated by units of thought
describing clearly diﬀerent semantic aspects. Therefore, the verbal
information of the ﬁrst sentences has not been considered in our analysis.
The examples above show clearly that a semantic idea can be described
linguistically extending over signiﬁcantly larger and more complex
segments of speech than just isolated clausal units.
Scoring the information
Instead of one broad semantic category that summarizes all diﬀerent
kinds of positional information, the semantic category ‘relative
position’ has been split up into four subcategories: 1) ‘agent-object’,
2) ‘agent-instrument’, 3) ‘object-instrument’ and 4) ‘object-surrounding
space’. Concerning ‘relative size’, we diﬀerentiated between information
about 5) the size of an agent, 6) the size of an object, and 7) the size
of an instrument. In the course of our analyses, each iconic gesture and
each segment of speech accompanying a gesture was considered, if it
represented information referring to any of the semantic categories.
Continuing on from this, the descriptive data was quantiﬁed by scoring
the semantic information using a binary code. This means that if a gesture
or a segment of speech provided clear information about one of the types
of positional information or about the size of an entity, the respective
semantic category was scored with 1, whereas a score of 0 was given for
the cases in which gesturally or linguistically, from an analyst’s point of
view, there was no information provided concerning any of these semantic
categories (see Table 2).
However, in some cases, an iconic gesture or a segment of speech was
relatively ambiguous or less clear concerning the representation of
Table 2. Hypothetical example of the gestural and the linguistic data generated by an
individual narrator and transformed into a binary code
Information about Gesture Speech
Agent-Object 1 0




Relative size Object 0 1
Instrument 0 0
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semantic information. This concerned principally the semantic categories
‘relative position: agent-object’, ‘relative position: object-space’ and
‘relative size: agent’. For example, the majority of narrators referring
gesturally to event 5 represented ‘full’ information about the relative
position of the agent (the dog) and the object (Tom) relative to each other
by holding the arm up in front of them and by extending it at the same
time. However, in one case a narrator held the arm in front of the body,
but close to the chest instead of extending it. Thus, the gestural
information about how agent and object are positioned relative to each
other, as suggested by the cartoon, was partly there, but clearly in a less
‘full’ form compared to those narrators who showed that Jerry is being
held in front of the agent and at a distance. A number of diﬀerent
linguistic representations referring to this event were also considered,
since there were some verbal utterances that provided ‘full’ information
about the relative position of agent and object by mentioning that ‘the
dog is extending his arm and holding Tom up in the air’, whereas some
narrators did not provide in a linguistic form the information that the dog
extends his arm. Referring to the category ‘relative position: object space’,
some speakers described event 3 linguistically, for example, by saying that
‘Tom’s tail is pinned down’, whereas other narrators referred to the
same event by saying that ‘Tom’s tail is pinned to the ground ’. The latter
verbal description is clearly more precise, since it provides the information
that Tom must be on the ground, whereas the ﬁrst verbal description
leaves more opportunity for interpretation concerning the kind of
surface which Tom is pinned down to, where this surface is within the
surrounding space, and thus where Tom is positioned relative to the space
that surrounds him (he might, for example, be sitting on a table, instead of
on the ground). Concerning the size of the agent, there were three cases in
which this semantic aspect was verbally less clearly deﬁned compared to
verbal utterances generated by other narrators. The majority of narrators
referred to the agent of event 4 as ‘a man’, ‘a park keeper’, ‘a park ranger’
etc., which provides the information that the agent is of the size of a
relatively grown-up human, whereas other narrators referred to the agent
merely as ‘a hand’, ‘a human’, or ‘a person’, and thus did not deﬁne
whether the agent was a child or a grown-up. Thus, they were less clear
about the size of the agent. Such cases, in which there was unclear
information provided, and which thus have been considered to leave
considerable opportunity for interpretation, have been scored with 0.5,
but have not been included in the present analysis.
The inter-observer reliabilities have been tested for each semantic
category for both gesture and speech. The percentage agreements
ranged from 83.3 for ‘relative position: agent-object’ (gesture) and
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‘relative position: object-space’ (speech) to 100 for ‘relative position:
agent-instrument’ (gesture), ‘relative size: agent’ (gesture), ‘relative
position: agent-object’ (speech), ‘relative position: agent-instrument’
(speech), ‘relative position: object-instrument’ (speech), ‘relative size:
agent’ (speech), and ‘relative size: object’ (speech). Cohen’s Kappa was
calculated for the scoring of information in the gesture and speech codes
by summing the data points from the diﬀerent semantic categories, which
resulted in K~.83 for both gesture and speech (the calculation of
individual Kappa values was not strictly possible for more speciﬁc
semantic categories due to the small number of data points involved). In
the following analysis, these scoring values 0 or 1 have each been
summarized across all iconic gestures, as well as across all segments of
speech (see Tables 3, 4, and 5 of the results section), for each semantic
category. Thus, we have generated a large data set consisting of binary
coded semantic information about position and size, which represented
the basis for testing statistically how the two channels of communication
(speech and gesture) represent these semantic features in talk.
Results
For the statistical analysis in this study, we applied Chi-square tests where
appropriate and the G-statistic, which is the log-likelihood ratio
goodness-of-ﬁt test, and which operates on the logarithmic transforma-
tion of the underlying frequencies, when the assumptions of the
Chi-square test were violated, because of small N’s.
Table 3. Observed frequencies for those examples scoring 0 or 1 for the semantic categories
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Table 4. Observed frequencies for those examples scoring 0 or 1 for the semantic categories











Table 5. Observed frequencies for those examples scoring 0 or 1 for the semantic categories
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Information about relative position
The ﬁrst semantic categories to be considered here are ‘relative position:
agent-object’ and ‘relative position: agent-instrument’. Table 3 provides
an overview of the relative frequency of examples scoring 0 or 1 for just
two of the four categories of ‘relative position’, namely ‘agent-object’
(A-O) and ‘agent-instrument’ (A-I). The ﬁgures show that information
about the relative position of agent and object, as well as about agent and
instrument, was throughout our sample encoded solely by iconic gestures,
and not at all be speech. The statistical analysis reveals that iconic gestures
are signiﬁcantly better than speech at conveying both of these categories
of semantic information ([A-O] w2~71.54, d.f.~1, p5.001; [A-I]
w2~37.13, p5.001).
The following examples, stemming from diﬀerent narrators and from a
variety of the six ‘semantic events’, illustrate how semantic information
about relative position: ‘A-O’ and about relative position: ‘A-I’ was
represented in the two respective modes of communication. These
examples can be seen as representative for the majority of gesture-speech
compounds analyzed in this study.
Example 1 (A-O and A-I):
‘the mouse is holding some pointy thing, and he’s [gonna sort of
spike him]’
[both hands rise in front of the narrator to about stomach
height, they clench into ﬁsts, the left hand is held behind the
right hand and they are pushing forward (2x)]
Considering only the linguistic utterance, there is no information
provided about either the relative position of agent and object, or about
the relative position of agent and instrument. The mouse could be
about to spike an object that is positioned in front of him as well as above
him, behind him, or at almost any other position. The mouse could
likewise be holding the instrument at almost any imaginable position
with reference to his body. On the contrary, if we consider only the
gesture, which demonstrates someone holding a thin object with two
hands pushing frontally forward, the information is provided that the
object, which the agent is pushing into with the instrument, is positioned
right in front of the mouse. Furthermore, the gesture shows that the
mouse is holding the instrument in front of the body at about stomach
height.
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Example 2 (A-O):
‘Bulldog’s got him sort of [. . . lifted him up in the air]’
[left hand rises in front of the narrator to the height of the face,
the arm is extended, the ﬁngers are slightly curled in and the
thumb is extended, but they do not touch each other so that
there is a round space created within the hand]
In this example, the narrator transfers himself into the role of the dog by
demonstrating that the dog is standing there extending his arm frontally,
with which he is holding Tom the cat up in the air. As in the example
above, the speech on its own leaves undeﬁned where the object is
positioned in relation to the agent. An interlocutor, who would receive
only the verbal information, could only guess the relative position of
agent and object, since, for example, the dog might be holding the cat up
in front of him, behind him, at the right side of his body, etc. However, by
imitating gesturally the dog’s posture and by illustrating the dog’s grip
around the cat’s neck, clear positional information concerning agent and
object is provided by the iconic gesture. The gesture on its own shows that
the cat is positioned right in front of the dog, and with reference to the
dog’s body that the cat’s face is being held at about the same height as the
dog’s face.
Example 3 (A-O):
‘Jerry’s being picked up by the dog, by [Jerry’s tail]’
[left hand rises in front of the narrator to about chest height,
the back of the hand is up and the ﬁngers are performing a
pincer-like grip, index ﬁnger and thumb are touching each other]
Here, again, we see that the utterance does not specify where the object is
positioned relative to the agent, since the dog could in practical terms hold
his arm in an almost inﬁnite range of diﬀerent directions, which would
change the position of the dog and Jerry relative to each other. Only the
gestural representation of the ‘semantic event’ provides the information
that the dog is holding the mouse in front of his body at about the height
of his chest.
However, when we focus on the other two subcategories of ‘relative
position’, which refer to the relative position of object and instrument
(O-I) and of the object in its surrounding space (O-S), we ﬁnd that a very
diﬀerent pattern emerges here compared to the ﬁndings with the
categories ‘relative position: A-O’ and ‘relative position: A-I’.
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Table 4 provides an overview of the relative frequency of examples
scoring 0 or 1 for the other two categories of ‘relative position’, namely
‘object-instrument’ (O-I) and ‘object-space’ (O-S), which shows that
information about ‘relative position: O-S’ was sometimes represented
linguistically, but never gesturally. This is also the case for information
about the relative position of object and instrument, apart from one single
exception, which we will refer to subsequently. And indeed, the statistical
analysis shows that speech is signiﬁcantly better than iconic gestures at
conveying both of these categories of semantic information ([O-I]
w2~15.6, d.f.~1, p5.001; [O-S] Gadj~187.71, d.f.~1, p5.001).
Examples from the present database are used again to demonstrate how
diﬀerent narrators represented information about the relative position of
instrument and object as well as of an object in its surrounding space in
gesture and speech:
Example 4 (O-I):
‘[this spike is stuck in Tom’s tail]’
[right hand rises in front of the narrator to about stomach
height, clenches into a ﬁst and moves down forcefully to about
the height of the seat, then it is stopped abruptly]
In this example, the utterance provides information about the relative
position of object and instrument relative to each other. A listener
receiving only the verbal information would know where the instrument is
placed relative to the object’s body, i.e., on the tail. On the other hand, the
iconic gesture here represents no information about this semantic aspect,
since it shows that the agent is pushing the instrument towards an object,
but not where it hits the object (Tom).
Example 5 (O-S):
‘the dog’s picked [him oﬀ and he’s just holding him] so that his feet
don’t touch the ground’
[right hand rises in front of the narrator’s body to about the
height of the shoulders, the arm is fully extended, the hand is
clenched into a ﬁst]
The speech from example 5 provides the information that the object is oﬀ
the ground, and thus it provides crucial information about the position of
the object within its surrounding space. Linguistically, it is relatively easy
to deﬁne an object’s position in relation to the surrounding space, since we
can do this by simply describing the object’s position with reference to
spatial landmarks, such as ‘ground’ or ‘ceiling’ or with reference to other
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objects within the surrounding space, which are of a deﬁned height, for
example ‘on top of the house’ or ‘in a tree’. However, iconic gestures are
mostly not generated with reference to the ‘real space’, but happen within
a particular gestural space, which McNeill (1992: 1) describes as a space
that ‘is not the speaker’s space, but a ﬁctional space, a narrative space that
exists only in the imaginary world of the discourse’. For example, a
narrator imitating punching someone in the face is not likely to rise from
his seat just to be able to demonstrate the movement at the appropriate
height at which it happened compared to the surrounding space.
Similarly, the iconic gesture from example 5 provides no information
about the relative position of the object within its surrounding space. The
narrator uses here only his or her own body as a positional reference
point, but does not rise from the seat to be able to demonstrate the exact
height at which the cat is held by the dog.
Thus, in summary, with regard to our data on relative position, it is
important to note that two of our more precise semantic categories of
relative position, ‘agent-object’ and ‘agent-instrument’, seem to be in line
with Beattie and Shovelton’s observations that iconic gestures are
particularly eﬀective at communicating relative positional information,
but two of the semantic categories, ‘object-instrument’ and ‘object-space’,
do not conform to this pattern. This result highlights the importance of
breaking the broad category of relative position down into its necessary
components and suggests that the broad category of relative position as
used by Beattie and Shovelton may have masked some important and
indeed critical diﬀerences.
Information about relative size
Table 5 reveals some striking and extremely surprising results. Beattie and
Shovelton found that iconic gestures were also particularly well suited to
convey size information. But the present approach, scoring the
information contained within the iconic gesture and within the speech,
reveals quite the opposite pattern. Information about size of agent, object,
and instrument seems almost universally to be done by the speech itself
rather than by the iconic gesture. Indeed, we have only one case in which
the iconic gesture seems to be adding information about the relative size
of the respective instrument (this case is identical with the one case in
which information about ‘relative position: object-instrument’ was
represented gesturally, and which will be discussed subsequently).
The statistical analysis reveals that speech is signiﬁcantly better than
iconic gestures at conveying semantic information about the size of agent,
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object, and instrument ([agent] w2~46.9, p5.001; [object] w2~112.07,
p5.001; [instrument] w2~21.33, p5.001 respectively). The following
examples illustrate how size information has been represented by diﬀerent
narrators. Again, these examples are representative for the gestural and
the linguistic data that most of the narrators generated referring to the
respective ‘semantic events’, which represented the basis for the present
analysis.
Example 6:
‘Jerry’s gonna [put this cue through his tail]’
[left hand rises to chest height, clenches into a ﬁst, moves down
with force, and stops abruptly near the height of the lap]
Although in this example the speech provides no information about
explicit size (such as ‘the big cat’ or ‘the small cat’), information about the
size of all of the three entities involved is represented implicitly by speech.
Information about the size of the agent is represented linguistically by
mentioning the agent’s cartoon name ‘Jerry’. The name characterizes the
agent’s identity, and thus in the context of this cartoon also that the agent
is a mouse, since the narrators used the cartoon names assuming that any
interlocutor knows who the characters are that the names represent. Thus,
by naming the agent, an interlocutor would know that in this case the
narrator refers to the mouse, and of course, the cognitive concept
(cf. Anderson and Robert 1995) of a mouse includes the information that
the entity is of small size. Therefore, background assumptions, including
an average size of any entity, have to be considered as information about
size. Since in cartoon stories proportions are not necessarily true to life,
the semantic category has been called ‘relative size’. The mouse in the
cartoon is compared to other features often bigger than in reality, but
the relative diﬀerences are sustained throughout the cartoon (i.e., the
mouse is always considerably smaller than the cat, and the cat is smaller
than the dog). Apart from directly naming the cartoon characters by their
cartoon names or their animal names, linguistic information about the
size of entities has also been provided by referring to the entities with
their pronouns, in this example the use of the word ‘his’. A ‘pronoun’, of
course, represents a grammatical substitute for the proper name that can
be used when due to the context it is clear what the pronoun refers to. In
other words, the pronoun ‘his’ provides size information about the object,
since it is clear from the context of the story that it stands here for ‘Tom’,
and thus, it is associated with the knowledge we have about the size of this
cat. However, the iconic gesture accompanying this utterance demon-
strates the stabbing movement that the agent performs, but does not
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reveal any size information about any of the entities involved. Although
the narrator transfers here into the role of the agent, he or she, of course,
does not adopt the agent’s size, which means that for a narrator imitating
the action that an agent performs, it is hardly possible to represent
gesturally information about the size of the agent at the same time.
Concerning the object, the iconic gesture does not represent any
information about the object’s size either, since all the gesture in this
example depicts, referring to the object, is that there is another entity,
which the agent is acting on with the instrument, but it does not depict any
speciﬁc information about the object itself.
Example 7:
‘Jerry will prod him . . . with . . . with a pen or something that he’s
got, with a sharp instrument, either in his toe, or maybe in his tail,
or [poke him in the bum or something]’
[right hand clenches into a ﬁst, is swung up vertically in front of
the narrator at the right side of the body and drops down again]
In example 7, information about the size of the agent and the object is,
again, represented verbally by either directly mentioning the name or by
mentioning the pronoun. And as in the previous example, the iconic
gesture demonstrates the agent’s action (the hand clenching into a ﬁst to
grab the instrument), but no information about the size of the agent or of
the object is represented gesturally. Even though the gesture shows the
agent gripping the instrument, it does not show what size the instrument is
as a whole (in fact, the cartoon picture shows that the instrument is even
taller than Jerry, which the iconic gesture does certainly not reveal). Only
the segment of speech provides here information about the size of the
instrument as a whole (the size of a pen). Thus, size information
concerning the entities involved, again, has been provided exclusively by
speech, and not by gesture.
Example 8:
‘the warden is carrying him by . . . [by the scruﬀ of his neck]’
[hand rises in front at the right side of the narrator’s body,
clenches into a ﬁst, moves quickly up to the height of the
shoulder and down again, then moves back into rest position]
The latter statement applies equally to example 8, as here information
about the size of the agent and the object is represented linguistically,
whereas the accompanying iconic gesture shows the agent’s movement,
or action, but it does not reveal any information about how big or
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small the agent is performing the action, or about how big or small
the object is, which the gesture demonstrates that the agent is picking up.
Once again, the utterance provides this information by naming the agent
(warden), which reveals that the agent must be the size of a relatively
grown-up human, and the object is characterized concerning size by
mentioning the pronoun ‘him’, which refers in this context to Tom the cat.
In conclusion, we would suggest that the statistical analyses of the
semantic information within the gestural and linguistic channels reveal
highly interesting results, since they, at times, seem to contradict the
broad conclusions by Beattie and Shovelton (1999a, 1999b, 2002). In the
following pages, we will oﬀer further analyses that may provide some
explanation as to why the ﬁndings of the present study suggest that
information about position and size is less well encoded by iconic gestures
than the studies of Beattie and Shovelton might suggest.
Gestural viewpoint and the representation of position and size information
As we have already discussed, Beattie and Shovelton’s analyses provide
evidence that diﬀerences in the gestural viewpoint might have an eﬀect
on the semantic information that iconic gestures convey. Here, we
consider gestural viewpoint using a micro-analytic approach.
Since C-VPT gestures by deﬁnition involve the narrator him- or herself
transferring into the role of the character so that the narrator’s body
represents the body of the character, this type of iconic gesture appears
suitable to represent information about the positional relation of agent
and second or third entities, such as objects and instruments. The transfer
into the agent’s role has the advantage that the relative position of entities
other than the agent can be easily depicted by using the own body as a
spatial reference point. O-VPT gestures, on the other hand, do not oﬀer
the possibility to represent information about entities in relative position
to the agent as clearly and easily as C-VPT gestures. An O-VPT gesture
means that the narrator’s arm and hand represent the character as a
whole. Thus, it is logical that it would be far more complicated to
illustrate, for example, if an object is positioned behind or in front of the
agent, and if it is being held at the height of the stomach or rather at the
height of the face, since this would require that the narrator’s arm and
hand are exactly deﬁned in terms of what represents the character’s front
and which part of the hand or arm represents the stomach, etc.
Considering the categories that refer to positional information, but which
do not involve the agent (i.e., the positional relation of object and
instrument and of an object in its surrounding space), we can say that
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these tend to be not represented by C-VPT gestures. Concerning the latter
category (O-S), it has already been suggested that iconic gestures in
general are not very good at representing information about the position
of an object in ‘real space’, and that linguistic means seem to be more
appropriate to provide this kind of information. And of course, the
relative position of an instrument relative to an object can hardly be
represented by C-VPT gestures, as here no agent is involved anyway (and
as soon as the narrator would use his or her hands to illustrate positional
information about other entities that does not refer to the agent, this
would, logically, be deﬁned as an O-VPT gesture again). However, O-VPT
gestures that occurred in the present study did not represent any
information about the relative position of object and instrument either.
Instead, this information was provided linguistically. The reason for this
can, again, be seen in the fact that it would be required to deﬁne, for
example, which of the hands represented the object and which the
instrument, or which part of one hand represents which body part of
the object to infer, on which part of the body the object was hit by the
instrument (e.g., tail). In short, it seems that positional information is
represented best by C-VPT gestures, if we are talking about position that
refers to an agent; otherwise, information about relative position seems to
be represented best by speech, and O-VPT gestures seemed not to be
involved in the representation of any kind of positional information in the
present study (the single case where we found a gesture to represent
information about ‘relative position: O-I’ was a special type of gesture; see
example 11).
Indeed, O-VPT gestures only seem to represent one category of
positional information, that is, the position of one object relative to
another. Although this is a semantic category that does not appear in the
present study, we decided to include this category in the discussion to
complete our description of the eﬀects that diﬀerent gestural viewpoints
can have on the representation of position and size information. To
illustrate this point, we will therefore use an example taken from a
diﬀerent corpus of data.
Example 9:
‘they’re both jumping, [but Jerry is higher]’
[both hands have come to the front, the right hand is held at the
height of the chest in front of the narrator, the left hand is held
on the left side next to it, but at the height of the stomach. Both
hands are ﬂat, palms are pointing upward, the ﬁngertips are
pointing forward, and the hands move alternately up and down]
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In this example, one hand represents Jerry, the other Tom, and the
alternating up and down movements of the hands show the way they are
jumping. Moreover, the fact that one hand is held higher than the other
symbolizes here that one of the characters is positioned higher relative to
the other, which demonstrates the representation of the relative position
of two objects (as they are not actually acting upon each other, they are
here seen as in the roles of objects, not as agents).
By investigating subtle diﬀerences between certain gestures, we
recognized another feature that seems to characterize many O-VPT
gestures, and which might also be relevant to the discussion of how
diﬀerent types of iconic gestures represent position and size information.
Again, we use an example to illustrate our argument.
Example 10:
‘he’s just been stabbed with [that thing]’
[left hand rises in front of the narrator, the palm is pointing
upward, the ﬁngertips are pointing to the ceiling as well, the tip
of the index ﬁnger and the thumb touch each other and let go
again (46) very quickly]
This gesture shows one of the few cases in which a narrator did not
generate a C-VPT but an O-VPT gesture accompanying the verbal
description of ‘event 2’ (see method section). Unlike a C-VPT gesture, the
gesture here does not represent what Jerry has done with the poker, or
Jerry directly holding the poker, but emphasizes the pointy feature about
the object. This means that all kinds of positional information that has
been represented by most of the C-VPT gestures referring to this event
cannot be represented in this case, but therefore the gesture provides
information about one particular feature of the instrument. Also, O-VPT
gestures are frequently used to emphasize that objects are particularly big
or small. Everyone knows probably the typical gesture, which involves
that both hands are held at the right- and left-hand side in front of the
body, often further apart from each other than the shoulders are broad,
with the hands being ﬂat and the ﬁngers extended, the palms pointing
inwards. This kind of gesture is generally used to show that something is
particularly big, but it does not necessarily reﬂect an object’s real size,
since, for example, it may accompany a description of a remarkably big
house as well as that of a big dog. All in all, it is therefore important to
note that it seems as if some O-VPT gestures are generated to illustrate
adjectival features that characterize actions or objects as being
particularly big, quick, especially shaped (e.g., pointy, round), etc. This,
in turn, can be brought in association with the fact pointed out before,
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namely that some iconic gestures tend to represent diﬀerent aspects of
semantic information than other iconic gestures, and that when these
diﬀerences in iconic gestures are not kept distinct or considered
concerning the analysis, this can lead to distorted results.
Moreover, it shows that a gesture, which illustrates that something is
especially big, and which is thus not necessarily referring to real size,
diﬀers in the information it represents from information about marked
size or explicit size. And here we might consider why the results of the
present study concerning size information contradict the ﬁndings by
Beattie and Shovelton. In the current study, we captured information
about marked size (man, cat, dog, etc.), whereas Beattie and Shovelton
(1999a) asked decoders to state if any of the objects were particularly big
or small. In some studies (1999b, 2002), Beattie and Shovelton used
slightly diﬀerent questions by asking instead, ‘How big are any of the
objects identiﬁed?’ Apart from the fact that, compared to a question such
as, ‘What size are any of the objects identiﬁed?’, the style of this question
itself suggests that the objects are big rather than small, and apart from
the fact that a typical feature of cartoons is that things are frequently
particularly big, done particularly quickly, etc. (which are both aspects
that might inﬂuence decoders’ answers and thus distort the results), size
information, indeed, turned out not to be signiﬁcantly well conveyed by
iconic gestures. This supports our argument that it is important to
distinguish between size information referring to objects being particu-
larly big or small and average size or marked size, since it hints at the
fact that Beattie and Shovelton might have questioned their participants
about diﬀerent kinds of size information in their studies.
However, information about size has not been represented by C-VPT
gestures (as deﬁned by McNeill) either, but almost exclusively by speech.
The reason for this, again, becomes clear if we consider how C-VPT
gestures represent semantic information. Imagining C-VPT gestures
providing information about the overall size of whole entities, such as that
of an agent, an object, or an instrument, while the narrator depicts the
agent and his or her action, would not only be far more complicated but
rather impossible without performing a number of separate gestures,
which would almost resemble a pantomimic presentation. For example, a
narrator would have to provide the information that the object is a cat by
depicting its ears, the tail, the height, and so on, and only after the
information about the identity of the entity has been intelligibly depicted
could the narrator go on to describe the recipient of the action in the
same way, and in another step, the narrator would have to try to represent
the relationship between these entities (i.e., who the agent is, what the
agent is doing, and towards whom).
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As pointed out before, in one exceptional case a gesture was seen to
represent information about size as well as about the relative position of
object and instrument — both semantic aspects that were represented
purely linguistically in all other cases. Of course, we were curious to ﬁnd
out in which way this gesture diﬀered from the rest of the gestures. Since
we found, in the course of further analysis, that the way iconic gestures
represented certain semantic features explained a lot of diﬀerences
concerning the representation of semantic information, we traced back
which of the gestures that were analyzed constituted the one exception
(example 11).
Example 11:
‘but [that spike is still in his tail]’
a) [the right hand rises quickly from the height of the lap in
front of the narrator’s body to about shoulder height, while the
index ﬁnger is extended. When the hand reaches shoulder height,
it immediately moves down again the same way]
b) [when the hand reaches the starting point again (height of
the lap in front of the body), without stopping, the hand moves
directly from this position horizontally backwards, still with the
index ﬁnger extended, so that at the end of the movement the
hand points behind the narrator’s back]
A closer look at this gesture-speech compound reveals that we are here
confronted with a very special type of iconic gesture: one that starts as an
O-VPT gesture and ﬁnishes as a C-VPT gesture. McNeill (1992) deﬁned
this kind of iconic gesture as incorporating a ‘dual viewpoint’, which he
exempliﬁed himself by the following gesture:
Example 12:
‘and then he [throws] a ﬁve-hundred-pound weight’
[hands move forward and down, showing throwing motion, and
end in points, showing the direction of the weight]
(extracted from McNeill 1992: 98).
McNeill described this gesture as a ‘dual viewpoint gesture’, because
it consists of two components in the sense that ‘the gesture begins as
a character viewpoint of throwing and ends in pointing, which has
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the viewpoint of an observer’ (McNeill 1992: 98). Equivalently, the
gesture in example 11 begins as an O-VPT gesture a), since here the
index ﬁnger demonstrates the dimensions of the stick (index ﬁnger moving
up and down along the dimensions of an imagined stick), then it continues
as a C-VPT gesture b), because the hand with the extended index ﬁnger
moves slowly backwards, away from the narrator, showing the dimensions
of an imagined tail, and at the end, the hand points towards the end of
the imagined tail to demonstrate where the stick has been put through.
Thus, we can say that this gesture, incorporating a special kind of
viewpoint, is partly composed of an O-VPT gesture that represents
size information. Why, in this case, the size of the instrument was
represented gesturally, unlike in all of the other cases, we cannot explain,
but one assumption would be that it has something to do with the special
kind of composition of the gesture and the dual viewpoint. Concerning
the fact that in this example information about the relative position of
object and instrument was also provided gesturally, even though this was
not the case in any of the other cases, we can here identify the reason more
precisely by saying that the gesture diﬀers subtly from a C-VPT gesture as
deﬁned by McNeill. Although the narrator transfers here into the role of
the character, which is indicated by the fact that he or she demonstrates
the tail as starting at the own backside and the spike as being stuck
behind the narrator at a place where the imagined tail ends, the narrator’s
arms and hands do not represent the character’s arms and hands (they
obviously perform movement, which the character’s hands do not
perform). Since, in association with the analysis of other data, we found a
number of other examples in which the narrator transferred into the role
of a character and at the same time used his or her hands to specify a
region on the body of the character, or a body part (see example 13), and
since these gestures thus bear crucial diﬀerences to the C-VPT gestures as
deﬁned by McNeill, we decided to distinguish them as a special type of
C-VPT gestures by terming them ‘BARP-gestures’ (‘Body as Reference
Point’).
Example 13:
‘he’s [got soot or whatever it is on him]’
[right hand moves close towards the narrator’s chest, the hand is
ﬂat, the palm is facing the chest, the hand moves up and down
quickly in small movements to indicate the area on the dog’s
body where the soot is]
Once again, we thus have to note that subtle diﬀerences indicate that we
are here dealing with a special type of gesture, which is also characterized
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by the fact that it diﬀers from other iconic gestures in the way it refers to
a category’s position and size. Although the separation between both
channels of communication concerning size information might seem
clear, example 11 proves that it is possible that iconic gestures can
represent size information.
In conclusion, we can say that it seems that crucial diﬀerences exist
between C-VPT gestures and O-VPT gestures in the way that they
represent semantic information about position and size. Moreover, within
both of these categories, we recognized subtle but important diﬀerences
in how they provide position and size information. Diﬀerent types of
iconic gestures seem to be more or less eﬀective at encoding informa-
tion about position and size, even if in some cases these diﬀerences seem
to be rather subtle. Generally speaking, our ﬁndings support those of
Beattie and Shovelton (2002), since our analyses show that C-VPT
gestures are better at representing positional information than O-VPT
gestures; but our analyses go beyond Beattie and Shovelton’s ﬁndings,
since we show more clearly how C-VPT gestures represent information
about relative position, and thus we oﬀer a plausible argument as to why
positional information is predominantly represented by C-VPT gestures.
Furthermore, our analyses reveal why O-VPT gestures tend not to
represent positional information. However, there is one particular aspect
of relative position, at which O-VPT are particularly eﬀective, and even
better than C-VPT gestures. Therefore, we conclude that diﬀerences in the
gestural viewpoint are a very signiﬁcant aspect of how iconic represent
and communicate semantic information.
Discussion
The ﬁndings of the present study revealed a clear pattern showing how
iconic gestures and speech represent information about position and
size. These ﬁndings suggest that certain types of positional information
are represented gesturally and others linguistically, and furthermore,
that size information in the present study seems to have been exclusively
encoded linguistically, except in one particular case. Some of these
ﬁndings thus stand in contrast to those of Beattie and Shovelton (1999a,
1999b, 2002), who claim that information about both size and position
are especially well represented by iconic gestures.
There are a number of possible explanations for this divergence.
One possible reason might be that the present study is based on the
information that is actually encoded in gesture and speech (as seen from
an analyst’s perspective), rather than what information is actually
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transmitted to decoders. This may lead us subsequently to the question
of which types of information within a signal are picked up by decoders
and which are not.
Furthermore, in the present study, we analyzed gestural and verbal data
that has been generated during dialogues instead of during monologues.
As we argue in the introduction, there is solid evidence that the frequency
of gestures increases dramatically in association with conversational
interaction. In the present study, we found that only 13.2 percent of the
participants (5 out of 38) did not produce any gestures at all, which stands
in considerable contrast to studies based on monologue situations, and in
which on average about 50 percent of the participants do not produce any
gestures (see Beattie and Shovelton 1999a). Thus, we would claim that the
present study based upon conversational data, in which a high proportion
of participants use gestures, is more representative of everyday talk and
clearly entails a higher proportion of our sample of participants being
involved in the actual analysis.
Furthermore, in terms of research on gestures and speech, McNeill
had employed a traditionally linguistic method, with the analysis based
exclusively on clausal units, which Beattie and Shovelton also attempted
to apply in their studies, with the notable exception of their ﬁrst study
(1999a), in which the size of the speech extracts varied (example 15 below
represents just such a case, in which Beattie and Shovelton used a speech
extract considerably larger than an individual clausal unit). In the
introduction, we hinted that one consequence of this focus on the clause
might be that certain aspects of semantic information were ignored
because they were represented linguistically in those parts of speech
outside the clausal units under consideration. Thus, in the present analysis
we used ideational units, instead of clausal units, as exempliﬁed below.
Example 14:
‘Jerry will prod him . . . with . . . with a pen or something that he’s
got, with a sharp instrument, either in his toe, or maybe in his tail,
[or poke him in the bum or something]’
[right hand clenches into a ﬁst, is swung up vertically in front of
the narrator at the right side of the body, and drops down again]
Considering this example, it becomes obvious that the clausal unit with
which the iconic gesture co-occurs [‘or poke him in the bum or
something’] contains only a fragment of the semantic information that
is uttered verbally to describe the semantic idea completely. Here, it would
not be possible to argue that the gesture refers only to the verbal
Micro-analytic investigation of iconic gestures and speech 63
description of the movement of the action, i.e., the poking movement,
since the narrator himself transfers into the agent and shows the grip
around the instrument, which the narrator refers to verbally, but previous
to the respective clausal unit. This illustrates that here an analysis on a
clause-by-clause basis would have revealed a slightly distorted picture,
since the result would show that there is no linguistic information about
either the agent or the instrument.
As seen in the results section, the name of the cartoon character
also conveys, at least implicitly, information about the character’s size.
In this case, size information about the agent is provided verbally by
mentioning the word ‘Jerry’; however, this word is not part of the
clausal unit that the iconic gesture accompanies. Thus, in association with
the present study, this would have been scored as speech providing
information about the size of the agent, whereas an analysis based on a
clause-by-clause analysis would have revealed that linguistically there is
no information about the size of the agent represented. This is only one
example, but it should make clear that such diﬀerences accumulated
over the whole analyses of a large corpus of data might be consider-
able, and that therefore this might be another reason for the discrepant
results of the present study compared with the Beattie and Shovelton
studies.
Furthermore, diﬀerences concerning the scoring criteria that are
applied to the data can lead to quite diﬀerent results (even when identical
semantic categories are being considered). This applies in particular to
information about size, since Beattie and Shovelton seemed to have used
slightly diﬀerent scoring criteria than we used here. In their ﬁrst study
(1999a), referring to the iconic gesture described in example 15, they asked
their participants, ‘Is the bench seat extremely large?’ (1999a: 16), and
they considered ‘no’ as being the correct answer, because ‘the gesture
consisted of circular movements of the index ﬁnger, and the circular
movements were small’ and therefore, ‘the gesture was believed to convey
the idea that the bench seat was not particularly large’ (1999a: 16).
Example 15:
‘Um they take the table home and it’s actually a round table with a
bench sort of [seat around it (pause)], which looks alright, because
it doesn’t have wizzy chairs or anything’
[left hand’s index ﬁnger makes small circular movements]
But was this really the most appropriate way to score the responses? One
might here argue that the iconic gesture in this example was in the ﬁrst
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place used to depict the round shape of the bench seat, but not its size,
since the bench seat was neither particularly small nor particularly large.
If the gesture here were considered as representing size information, the
only logical interpretation would be that it shows that something is
particularly small, which is represented by the extremely small circle
movements of the index ﬁnger. However, this is not what the cartoon
suggested, and therefore it does not seem plausible to assume that the
iconic gesture represented size information at all. Beattie and Shovelton,
however, considered the gesture to convey size information due to the fact
that the gesture did not show that the respective entity was particularly
big, since they argued that the gesture thus shows that the bench seat was
not extremely large. Thus, Beattie and Shovelton’s particular method for
scoring size information seems to rule out the possibility that an iconic
gesture may represent no size information at all, and that they may
represent information about size only when something is remarkably big
or small. Logically, using a methodology like this might have prevented
Beattie and Shovelton from ﬁnding that iconic gestures tend not to
represent information about average size.
If a diﬀerent narrator represented the same semantic aspect with the
same gesture, apart from the fact that the circles generated were of
double the diameter, would decoders answering the same question then
have stated that the bench seat was particularly large? In other words, the
point is here what is being considered as critical size information, and also
what is possible to be depicted gesturally. It is hardly possible to represent
the actual size of the bench seat gesturally, unless we stand up and walk
around in a circle imitating the size of the circumference of the bench with
our hands. Furthermore, referring to the kind of size information that is
considered as being relevant, it has to be noted that it makes a diﬀerence,
if any kind of size information that is represented gesturally is scored, or if
only size information is considered as being relevant that meets certain
criteria. This becomes clearer, if we consider example 6 from the results
section:
‘Jerry’s gonna [put this cue through his tail]’
[left hand rises to chest height, clenches into a ﬁst, moves
down with force, and stops abruptly near the height of the lap]
Of course, the iconic gesture in this example, if seen by a decoder in the
absence of speech, could be judged as conveying some kind of size
information. For example, the decoder might state that the narrator
imitates holding a short knife in the hand by inferring this information
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from the size of the ﬁst, which appears to embrace an imagined
instrument. However, the stimulus material shows the mouse holding an
instrument, which is of a far larger size than the mouse itself, and of which
the mouse’s hand covers only about a tenth of the actual length. This
makes clear that, although the iconic gesture might provide here some
size information, it does not necessarily mean that this is also critical size
information, since the instrument is here not small at all. In the present
study, we determined that one of the criteria for scoring size information
is ‘size of entities as a whole’, which in this case has been solely provided
linguistically, as the word ‘cue’ describes an instrument of a relatively
deﬁned size. If the information of gesture and speech is not matched
according to strict criteria such as these, i.e., with close reference to the
scene, confusion of diﬀerent aspects of size information can occur,
which is similar, for example, to the confusion of diﬀerent types of
positional information. Since it seems that Beattie and Shovelton did not
determine such strict criteria and thus combined diﬀerent kinds of size
information (information that is critical with reference to the scene versus
some kind of size information), as well as size information referring to
diﬀerent entities, this might be another explanation for the contradictory
ﬁndings.
Furthermore, we have argued that there are diﬀerent types of iconic
gestures particularly with regard to the viewpoint that they incorporate,
and we demonstrated that these diﬀerences in gestural viewpoint can
have a considerable eﬀect on the representation of position and size
information. Thus, it is logical that an analysis of the semantic features
that are represented by iconic gestures, which is not based on a careful
diﬀerentiation of ‘subtypes’ of iconic gestures, makes any accurate
interpretation of the results considerably harder. In the present study,
we tried to control for this factor by analyzing in the ﬁrst place C-VPT
gestures, and only in cases in which such data was rare, we included
other types of iconic gesture (10 gestures out of 58). However, we took
care to ensure that it was possible to trace these cases back at any
point during the analysis and also concerning the interpretation of the
results. We were able to show that C-VPT gestures do seem well suited
to represent positional information, and we suggested why this is.
It turned out to be beneﬁcial that we employed a micro-analytic
approach, since the detailed semantic categories that we used, as well
as the careful diﬀerentiation made between subtle diﬀerences in
gestural viewpoint, revealed that Beattie and Shovelton’s analyses may
have masked the fact that O-VPT gestures seem able to represent one
particular aspect of positional information even better than C-VPT
gestures.
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To sum up, the fact that Beattie and Shovelton’s ﬁndings were based on
an analysis of a combination of iconic gestures which diﬀered in
viewpoint, whereas the present ﬁndings were derived from an analysis
mainly based on C-VPT gestures, may account for some of the diﬀerences
that emerged from these two studies.
Summary
This study, using a micro-analytic approach, revealed some of the detailed
ways in which the linguistic system and the gestural system interact in the
communication of semantic information. We used an approach similar to
that of McNeill (1985), rather than an approach using decoders like
Beattie and Shovelton (1999a, 1999b, 2002), and we attempted to
determine what information was present in the linguistic system and what
was present in the gestural system. The research suggested that relative
position for at least two of the possible categories of relative position
information was conveyed gesturally and that for two other categories it
was conveyed verbally. In terms of size information, the information
tended to be conveyed verbally. But what is interesting is that the two
systems rarely overlapped in terms of the communication of semantic
information. In other words, they are two systems, which are extremely
complementary in this domain.
Of course, the fact that in this study we did not ﬁnd conclusive evidence
that information about position and size was exclusively done through
iconic gestures raises some interesting issues about how we can reconcile
these ﬁndings with those of the decoder studies of Beattie and Shovelton.
We suggested a number of ways in which the two types of studies may
diﬀer. Of course, the information may be present in the speech signal or in
the gestural signal, but may not be employed by decoders, and this could
be a rather simple explanation for the discrepancy. But, we also argued
that, because we took extracts from more natural types of conversational
data in the present study, which involved a higher proportion of
participants, this must operate in favor of the ecological validity of the
present data. We also raised speciﬁc issues about how Beattie and
Shovelton have scored positional and size information. What we are not
attempting to do here is to substitute one type of methodology for
another, rather we are trying to obtain a fuller picture of how iconic
gestures and speech work together in the communication of semantic
information.
Concerning McNeill’s communication theory (1985), the present study
enables us to gain more insight into the kind of role that iconic gestures
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play in the communication of semantic information. By applying a range
of very detailed semantic categories, it was possible to carry out a fuller
analysis of the types of position and size information that was contained
in gesture and speech. Interestingly, the results reveal that information
about position and size is clearly partitioned between iconic gestures and
speech in the way that certain positional aspects are exclusively
represented by iconic gestures, whilst other aspects of relative position,
as well as information about size, are almost exclusively represented by
speech. Thus, the present ﬁndings support McNeill’s hypothesis that the
gestural and the speech systems must be closely interlinked, since they
seem to be well tuned in the way that they provide semantic information
about position and size. In other words, apart from one case, none of the
information provided by gesture or speech about ‘relative position’ and
about ‘relative size’ was redundant. Thus, we can be more precise
concerning statements about the interaction of iconic gestures and speech
than McNeill; the ﬁndings of this study suggest that it seems that both
channels of communication, gesture and speech, complement each other
in a near-perfect fashion, at least concerning the representation of
positional and size information.
Since this research emphasizes the communicational role of iconic
gestures, one goal of future research must consist of testing the interaction
of iconic gestures and speech using a broader range of semantic
categories. Only by investigating an even fuller range of semantic aspects
can we discover whether the pattern of complementarity between both
systems of communication holds more generally. Only then will we truly
understand how the linguistic and the gestural systems cooperate to
communicate meaning in everyday talk.
Appendix
Transcription conventions:
Segments of speech analyzed are marked using ‘single quotes’. Dots
indicate pauses in speech. That part of the verbal utterance that was
directly accompanied by the iconic gesture is marked using [square
brackets], thus the brackets indicate the start and end points of the iconic
gesture with respect to the speech. The iconic gesture that accompanied
the verbal utterance is described underneath the extract of speech in each
case, and this description is also contained within square brackets. In
the present study, we considered the iconic gesture as a whole in our
transcriptions, whereas in the gesture transcriptions extracted from
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McNeill (1992) only the start and end points of the stroke phase of the
iconic gesture are marked (see McNeill 1992: 12).
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